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Abstract: This paper offers a new way of considering places as special types of categories, in 
human cognition of larger-scale environments. This may provide an explanatory cognitive 
model for a range of known phenomena from environmental psychology and human geography 
- notably places' semantic salience and vague, unstable boundaries. Using such a model to apply 
suitable classification approaches may enhance geographic information (GI) for key public-
facing users, such as emergency services and planners. Two empirical studies confirmed that a 
spatially extended place (e.g., suburban locality or neighborhood) may be stored as a category 
whose exemplars are memorable individual locations or scenes. Using a questionnaire-based 
method to partly replicate key findings from the semantic memory literature (Barsalou, 1985; 
Lynch, Coley and Medin 2000), the studies tested the relevance to such places of known 
semantic memory phenomena including graded membership, typicality versus ideals, expertise 
and context effects. The discussion considers the link between semantic and spatial vagueness 
of places. 
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1. Introduction 
In 2015, a journalist named Nigel Chiwaya asked residents of New York City to draw 
the boundaries of what they thought of as their 'neighborhood' (named urban or 
suburban locality) on a map. New York is of course a typical New World city in many 
ways, with a planned regular and systematically numbered grid of streets, so we might 
expect relatively neat and clear boundaries within it. Instead, the results were 
spectacularly vague and disputed. Writing a summary of the results six weeks later, by 
which time over 12,000 city residents had responded, Chiwaya concluded that "while 
there's broad consensus over the heart of neighborhoods — everyone agrees that North 
3rd Street and Bedford Avenue is Williamsburg — borders are very much open to 
interpretation." (Chiwaya, 2015). 
Across the world this vagueness occurs in people's understanding of urban 
neighborhood boundaries - and of other kinds of place such as forests, villages and 
named areas of natural beauty) - though it often seems to surprise journalists and 
residents of 'new world' cities (Anonymous, 2007; Coleman, 2015; Grynbaum, 2012; 
Mason, 2017; D. Smith, 2009). It is deeply problematic for those who develop and 
maintain geographic information systems (GIS), which mostly depend upon crisp 
vector data for modelling spatial phenomena (Waters & Evans, 2003). Failure to define 
neighborhoods consistently thus impacts on emergency services, urban and social 
service planners, and other GIS users who need to relate 'hard' data and pinpoint 
coordinates back to residents' apparent idea of their city as a collection of vague 
neighbourhoods (Davies, Holt, Green, Harding, & Diamond, 2009). 
Some researchers have tried to automatically harvest and model vague and vernacular 
place information (Brindley, Goulding, & Wilson, 2018; C. B. Jones, Purves, Clough, 
& Joho, 2008; Kauko, 2009), but to date there is little understanding of the factors 
creating and predicting such issues. Indeed, some authors (e.g., Fisher 2000; Smith and 
Mark 2003) have raised the question of the Sorites paradox (in which there is 
effectively no clear point, and no way to decide, when you are definitively in/on the 
vaguely bounded entity). Smith and Mark (2003) even questioned whether a vaguely 
bounded entity can be said to exist, arguing that it might have to be represented only 
within an ontology since it had a common-sense semantic reality, but not a separate 
reality from continuously varying 'fields' (measurement values) in spatial data. 
Meanwhile, in social and environmental psychology and human(istic) geography, the 
vagueness, semantic richness and changeability of place have long been used to justify 
taking an entirely qualitative, humanistic approach to the topic (Cresswell, 2014; 
Withers, 2009). This has made it very hard for the insights from such research to be 
used to inform quantitative analyses and hence computational models of place, 
although some theoretical and practical efforts have been made to bridge the gap 
(Rantanen & Kahila, 2009; Sui & DeLyser, 2012). 
However, vague or 'fuzzy' boundaries between named categories of stuff have been 
familiar since the early 1970s to cognitive scientists studying semantic memory 
(Lakoff, 1973). This paper examines a key question for cognitive science concerning 
place: Is it possible to view places as simple cognitive categories - groupings of 
individual locations and addresses - so that their semantic characteristics might partly 
explain and model their vague (spatial) boundaries? In other words, does a person's 
understanding of places behave just like their knowledge of semantic categories, under 
conditions of varying uncertainty? 
Consider this analogy: a fashionably wide coffee-shop teacup can nowadays be as wide 
as a cereal bowl, but the presence of a handle and its usage as a drinking vessel 
constrain its definition. Similarly, the neighbourhood next door to mine may be equally 
residential in nature, but the presence of a school catchment boundary or a disparity in 
housing type (e.g., houses versus apartment blocks) may, for some people in some 
contexts, create an apparent boundary at one point rather than elsewhere. The boundary 
is spatial, in the same sense that the cup-bowl distinction is supposedly about physical 
shape. But the boundary point is decided by semantic, non-spatial factors, not by the 
metric distance from some geometric centroid or the degree of difference from a 
'perfect cup' prototype. In both cases, the position of the boundary may change when 
the item (cup or neighbourhood) is considered for different purposes (e.g., serving a 
stew or planning a bus route). Thus spatial and semantic fuzziness and flexibility are 
often closely linked. 
If we can show that places can behave as semantic categories by replicating known 
empirical findings on how categories behave, we could speculate that the same 
underlying semantic memory mechanisms may be involved. Then places are no longer 
awkwardly unexplained features of spatial cognition, but are typical semantic cognitive 
phenomena which happen to link closely to spatial knowledge. Personally recognised 
scenes and locations within a place may be stored as semantically related exemplars of 
it, not just as contiguous points in space. 
This may imply that we can apply half a century of research-driven insights about, and 
hence also our computational models of, human semantic categorisation to enable us to 
model places more realistically in GIS. The spatial vagueness exhibited by places such 
as an urban neighbourhood may then be at least partly predictable, by considering (1) 
how some of its semantic characteristics change 'fuzzily', and (2) how one clearly-
bounded characteristic might change at a different rate than another. 
This would help to expand our understanding of how semantic memory mechanisms 
are used in multiple domains. It could also finally help us to bridge the qualitative-
quantitative divide in psychology and human geography research into place. Indeed, 
the need for such unifying conceptual frameworks has previously been highlighted by 
researchers into place identity (Devine-Wright & Clayton, 2010). 
1.1 Scope and previous work 
At this point it should be made clear that this paper is not about the concept of 'place' or 
'placeness' in itself. Rather, we can consider as a category any particular place that 
extends over a physically extensive area - i.e., in topological terms, a certain region. 
Such a place may vary greatly in size, at spatial scales from the learnable-by-local-
navigation scale which Montello (1993) classified as 'environmental', to the even larger 
(country or large region) scale which he called 'geographic'. 
The question is whether, for any such place, we can treat it as a coherent category made 
up of single location exemplars (e.g., addresses, buildings, objects, landmarks, sections 
of streets, city blocks or even larger geographic landscape features), in exactly the same 
way that the cognitive science literature considers a semantic category (e.g., 'birds') as 
having many individual exemplars which we may also classify into subgroups. 
Previous studies have suggested that individual locations, scenes or 'vistas' in our 
navigable environment are privileged information (Meilinger, Riecke, & Bülthoff, 
2014; Tversky, 2000), but the idea that larger places serve to categorize such locations 
(semantically as much as spatially) has not been previously explored. As a city contains 
dozens or hundreds of stored scenes and locations, organizing structures such as 
neighborhoods might increase our cognitive efficiency when we think about it. The 
physical world itself does not invoke or require such structures (B. Smith & Varzi, 
2000), but we might need them. 
Of course, the boundaries of a location or scene are themselves vague, although this is 
out of scope of the current paper. For the present discussion we will assume that an 
exemplar can be any geographic feature or scene, typically only metres or tens of 
metres across. It usually includes at least one relatively fixed and mappable object in 
the outdoor world, such as an intersection, building or landmark. These scenes or 
features are referred to as 'locations' below. The containing place in which people seem 
to collect such locations will be called either a place or a neighborhood1, depending on 
context. The place may not necessarily have a name (a toponym), but often toponyms 
do develop spontaneously within local populations over time (Cardoso & Meijers, 
2016) - possibly even in robot communication (Schulz, Wyeth, & Wiles, 2011). 
Some previous research has suggested a role for cognitively categorizing visible 
spaces, from tabletop arrays of objects to world maps, usually to explain distortions in 
people's memory for items located within them (Holden, Newcombe, & Shipley, 2014; 
Kerkman, Friedman, Brown, Stea, & Carmichael, 2003; Lansdale, 1998; R Lloyd, 
Patton, & Cammack, 1996; Tversky, 1981). Such studies show that people tend to 
cluster or group points and items together, but have not explored the properties of those 
groupings - e.g., whether they may be fuzzy, predictable or context-dependent. At 
larger scales, logically it may be expected that people might again cluster local urban 
and suburban elements together. However, we do not know whether semantic 
categorization phenomena such as fuzziness and typicality, or gradedness against 
ideals, may apply to such inherently spatial groupings. 
Seeing a region as a coherent class of locations is also not new within geography 
(Montello, 2003). However, until now the cognitive features and implications of such 
regions have not been systematically tested, apart from a few studies on vague generic 
constructs such as 'downtown' (Montello, Goodchild, Gottsegen, & Fohl, 2003) and 
relational terms like 'near' (Worboys, Duckham, & Kulik, 2004). 
As implied earlier, geography as a discipline invokes many ontological complications 
surrounding the notion of 'place' itself. However, this paper will not discuss that debate. 
Instead we will focus on human place cognition, starting to empirically test people's 
informal understanding of what local named places are and where they extend to, and 
how far we can apply category theories and models. 
1.2 Graded structure 
Not all members of a category are equal. In cognitive psychology, following seminal 
studies by Rosch and colleagues (Rosch, Simpson, & Miller, 1976), the prevailing 
1970s view of a typical semantic category, such as 'bird', was that it had a graded 
structure in which some exemplars were deemed to belong better (i.e., to be more 
'typical') than others. This notion was clearly supported by evidence from a range of 
categorisation tasks (Barsalou, 1987). 
A well-known study by Barsalou (1985) focused on what else might determine graded 
structure other than nearness to an imagined prototype, and what might even cause the 
structure of a category to vary with context. Barsalou tested four possible determinants 
of graded structure: 
• central tendency (family resemblance to an average or prototype); 
• ideals (the properties most required for the concept to serve an intended 
purpose); 
• frequency of instantiation (how often the person has understood the exemplar 
to fall within the category); 
• familiarity with the exemplar itself. 
                                                   
1 The usual geographic term for urban districts is 'locality', but 'neighborhood' will be used to aid 
comprehension in this paper, to contrast more clearly with 'location'. 
Using a range of items and categories, Barsalou correlated participants' exemplar 
ratings on all four of these dimensions with ratings of the exemplar's 'typicality' within 
the category. The determinants of typicality were seen to vary with context and type of 
category, not stemming from a single source. 
If typicality is graded with respect to places as it is with non-spatial categories, then we 
should expect some of the locations within a place (neighborhood) to be consistently 
rated as more typical of that place than others. Barsalou noted that people could make 
discrete decisions to categorise items even when they accepted that the category 
boundaries were vague - and of course, this is also seen with the wider use of binary 
tasks such as card-sorting in other categorisation studies. Similarly, previous research 
into place boundary perception (e.g., Montello, Goodchild, Gottsegen, & Fohl 2003) 
has suggested that despite believing that a specified area had imprecise boundaries, 
people were willing to make discrete judgements when asked to delineate it. Thus the 
analogy to Barsalou's work seems plausible. 
The major dimension linking a place's exemplar locations together is obviously 
physical spatial nearness, the most basic aspect of geography. (At this scale of space, of 
course, spatial relations between locations are not all viewable from a single vantage 
point; thus 'spatial' no longer automatically implies a perceptual attribute as it does 
within a single array in visual cognition.) Nevertheless, semantic features often come 
into play in distinguishing one place from the next - such as residents' demographics, or 
functions such as residential or industrial estates. These features often tend to be 
characteristic but not uniquely defining: they may be necessary or sufficient or neither 
for distinguishing one place from the next. For instance, a residential neighborhood 
may also include some businesses, and a mixture of socioeconomic groups. Similarly 
with non-geographic categories, the possession of wings is a necessary common feature 
for birds, but not a sufficient one to distinguish the category from bats. 
What is as yet unclear about places, however, is whether people do actually see a given 
place as showing graded structure and a sense of 'typicality'. As most studies have 
simply collected and collated data across participants, effectively creating vagueness 
from disagreement, it is unclear whether or when the 'fuzziness' which is known to 
exist at the edges of places is due to an individual awareness of such gradedness, and 
thus an inherent 'wobbliness' about 'belonging' (see Hampton, 2007). 
1.3 Category structure types 
Barsalou (1985) was also the first to distinguish two types of category structure: 
common taxonomic (e.g. fruit, vehicles, and clothing) and goal-derived (e.g. birthday 
presents and camping equipment). He found that the determinants of graded structure 
were different according to the category type, with central tendency accounting for 
more variance in typicality for common taxonomic categories than for goal-derived 
categories, while ideals and frequency of instantiation were important determinants for 
both. Common taxonomic categories tend to reflect a strong perceptual similarity 
among members. Central tendency is more important for categories that represent 
similar information in the environment, because it helps with classification. Goal-
derived categories are less reliable for classification; their members are often 
perceptually and functionally quite dissimilar (e.g., "things I need to take on holiday"). 
If places are categories then they clearly provide some information about the structure 
of the environment, but we often assume that the information is primarily spatial (based 
on physical proximity), not taxonomic. Except where there is a clear physical bounding 
feature (such as a highway or railroad or river), we often cannot create a taxonomic 
definition that reliably predicts a place's boundaries. Places often also show far fewer 
consistent perceptual attributes across their extent (due to variations in the purpose, age 
and style of buildings, for instance) than do categories like ‘fruit’ and ‘birds’. So places 
might often be more like Barsalou’s goal-derived categories than taxonomies or those 
based on central tendency (closeness to a central or prototypical location or item). 
Nevertheless we might still expect to see graded structure, in the sense that typicality 
ratings of locations might vary across a specific place. 
In this view, we might expect a large influence of goal-based ideals - related to 
function more than proximity - on people's place boundary judgments  (Consider, for 
example, a house lying between a largely residential suburb and an industrial area, or 
between a higher- and a lower-income neighborhood.) 
It may not make much sense to talk about all places as having a specific functional 
'goal' that its attributes fulfil for people who have no personal interaction with it (e.g., 
the suburbs where you do not happen to live, work, shop or otherwise pursue a personal 
interest). However, it is still possible to imagine such places having an ideal feature or 
function which is distinct from its physical centre, and yet which is still important in 
defining that place. Ideals could include aesthetics such as ‘modern', 'scruffy' or ‘leafy’, 
or age, desirability, or a key function that 'says something' about the place. Thus 
Harrods department store might be the ideal embodiment of Knightsbridge, the famous 
London suburb, despite being unique within it. Ideals may also be temporary and task-
specific, such as deciding which households to leaflet in a campaign on a local issue, or 
considering desirable streets in which to live. 
Thus overall, in investigating people's understanding of places in their familiar home 
area, we may see one of three patterns: 
(a) If places are not processed cognitively as semantic categories, there may be no 
variation in typicality ratings, and boundaries will be crisp and not 
systematically influenced by task or contextual factors. 
 
(b) If places are processed like conventional taxonomic categories, then we may 
see gradedness of structure emerging from measures such as typicality ratings 
of exemplar scenes or locations, but typicality may be entirely predictable from 
physical and/or spatial attributes of individual locations or scenes. There will 
be no reason to expect the boundaries to be 'fuzzy' within a given individual: 
the classification of a given scene or address will not be changed by task or 
contextual factors once a person is familiar with the local area. 
 
(c) If places are at least partly goal- or ideal-related, then people will be generally 
more fluid about the relationship between typicality and category membership. 
We may find that they can be influenced in their categorisation judgements by 
contextual variables such as a decision they are asked to make, or rule-based 
domains requiring expertise. 
 
The following two experimental studies were designed to distinguish these three 
possibilities, and thus to establish how far places demonstrate the same cognitive 
phenomena as semantic categories.  
2. Study 1: Testing for Graded Structure 
Can a place be shown to have a graded structure like a semantic category, so that some 
exemplars (locations or scenes) belong more than others? What would this gradedness 
involve? We might first expect it to relate to the judgement of each location's 'goodness 
of example', and/or to personal familiarity, as much as to physical or spatial typicality, 
just as with some object categories (Barsalou, 1985). Thus the goal of Study 1 was to 
partially replicate Barsalou's classic 1985 study by asking participants to rate locations 
on typicality, familiarity and 'goodness of example', and examining the variations and 
correlations between these variables. 
However, an arguable flaw in Barsalou's original 1985 paper was its use of a between-
participants design. Different participants rated the items on different variables 
(goodness of example, fit to an ideal, etc.). As discussed above, a key question for 
place is whether gradedness exists within an individual's thinking about its locations. 
Thus the present study was designed as within-participants instead: the same 
participants would be asked to rate a set of locations within each urban neighborhood 
(picked after showing good recognition in a previous pilot study) on goodness of 
example, personal familiarity and fit to an ideal (again derived from pilot participants' 
descriptions of the neighborhoods). 
Barsalou's original variables included similarity and frequency of instantiation. These 
make some sense for categories where items are clearly delineated individual objects. 
They are less conceptually clear, however, where individual elements are vaguely 
bounded locations or scenes. Here even a clarifying photograph would contain a 
number of items, and a potentially wide variety of different interpretations as to what is 
meant by either 'similar' or 'frequently occurring' (e.g., a similar photographic angle or 
viewshed; inclusion or exclusion of infrastructure features such as a roadway; choosing 
one or another item that stands at that street intersection; etc.). The present study, 
therefore, focused on Barsalou's less ambiguous variables, just testing the notions of 
gradedness and of ideals, and the influence of personal familiarity. 
Barsalou found no effect of familiarity when naming generic items as potential 
category members, but this may be because his participants were actually rating generic 
concepts of items rather than specific exemplars (e.g., the concept of 'suitcase' rather 
than 'this particular battered brown case with a broken handle'). Familiarity would be 
expected to play more of a role when actual exemplars were being shown, as found in 
object concept studies (Hannah & Brooks, 2009). 
As above, the main experimental hypotheses were that people would show some degree 
of systematic variation in their ratings of all locations within a place (not just lower 
ratings at the periphery), and that consistency with an 'ideal' would also be related to 
this if places were goal/ideal-based to some extent. It was also expected that with the 
locations being specific exemplars instead of generic concepts, personal familiarity 
would also influence people's goodness-of-example ratings. 
2.1 Participants 
Forty-two adult participants (21 females) aged between 18 and 70 took part in the 
study. They had varying lengths of residence (mean = 20.4 years, s.d. = 15.7, min = 1, 
max = 59) of the southern English city of Southampton (population about 300,000), 
where they were tested. All participants had responded to local advertising posters to 
recruit research participants for a range of studies. Participants were paid £10 plus 
travel expenses for taking part; the sessions took less than half an hour. 
2.2 Materials and Procedure 
After consent and briefing, participants were given a randomly assigned version of the 
booklet described below, and asked to work through it at their own pace. 
A printed booklet of questionnaires was developed, containing an instruction page and 
three sections. Five versions of the booklet were prepared, counterbalancing the order 
of the three sections described below and of the neighborhoods within each section. 
The 'familiarity' section first asked participants to rate on a scale of 1-9 their personal 
familiarity with five urban neighborhoods (localities) within Southampton. Picked from 
pilot study data for their generally high levels of recognition and knowledge among 
residents, these five neighborhoods were chosen to be non-contiguous and distinct in 
their character, varying in socioeconomic as well as functional characteristics. Within 
the same 'familiarity' section, participants then had to similarly rate their familiarity 
with 68 individual locations, grouped by neighborhood; the order of both the 
neighborhoods and the locations within them had been randomly determined. Each 
locality or location was presented next to a 9-point scale on which 1 was labelled not at 
all familiar and 9 was labelled very familiar.  
Another section, entitled 'Goodness of example', was designed to assess how typical 
each location was of its corresponding locality. Participants were presented with the 
five sets of locations grouped by neighborhood, with each neighborhood again 
presented on a separate page. Participants rated each location on a scale of 1-9 as to 
how good an example of that place each location was. The endpoints for the scale were 
labelled 1 for poor example and 9 for excellent example. (For convenience and 
following common practice, this variable is called 'typicality' below.) 
To obtain judgements about locations' contribution to a neighborhood's 'ideal', the 
procedure was similar to the above, except that this time an 'ideal' description of each 
neighborhood's commonly agreed characteristics (collated from pilot studies asking 
participants to provide one) was presented beneath its name; participants were asked to 
rate how far each location contributed to that description of the place. The end points 
for the rating scales were labelled 1 for very low amount and 9 for very high amount. 
   
  
Figure 1. The top-typicality-rated image for each of the five neighborhoods (left to right, top: 
Shirley, Bedford Place, Highfield. Bottom: Ocean Village and St Mary's). 
For each version, an accompanying booklet called 'Locations' was provided which 
presented captioned photographs of all 68 locations, grouped by neighborhood and 
listed in the same order as in the questionnaires, to facilitate their recognition by 
participants. Instructions within the questionnaire booklet asked participants to view 
the photographs in parallel with the questionnaires as needed. (Examples of the photos 
and of the captions are shown in Table 1 and in Figure 1 below.) 
Finally, participants were briefed, thanked and paid. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Descriptives 
Participants were clearly willing to discriminate among locations within 
neighborhoods, with a similarly substantial standard deviation across all of them (see 
Table 1). An examination of the mean typicality scores for each location shows which 
kinds of locations were more readily associated with particular neighborhoods, and 
how strongly. Table 1 shows the top three typicality-rated locations within each 
neighborhood, and their mean typicality score; Figure 1 shows the accompanying 
photographs of the first (top-scoring) location in each case.  
The three main shopping streets for Shirley, Bedford Place and St Mary’s were all rated 
as strong exemplars of those localities, along with distinctive landmarks or 
constructions like the stadium in St Mary’s or the university in Highfield. (In reality, 
most of each locality is residential; images of actually typical residential buildings were 
also presented in each case, but were less highly rated except in Bedford Place, which 
is unique in its streets of elegant Georgian terraces.) The highest mean typicality scores 
overall were for Shirley 'High Street' (not its official name), and for the marina in 
Ocean Village. Both are actually very distinctive, non-typical, features of the respective 
localities. 
Unsurprisingly, given that all of the locations were picked based on previous 
descriptions and recognition scores, none of the locations were rated as particularly bad 
examples of the localities. The lowest mean typicality score was 4.62, for a 
commonplace-looking corner shop in Highfield (usually considered the most upmarket 
neighborhood in the city), with the highest in that locality being 7.52 for the building at 
the entrance to the university campus (which covers a large area of the neighbourhood). 
By contrast, the lowest mean 'ideals' score across participants was only 2.79, for the fire 
station in St Mary's (a working-class locality with a 'rough' reputation, where the 
highest 'ideal' score was 6.93 for some terraced houses). 
 
2.3.2 Correlations 
The Pearson correlation between mean scores on typicality and on ideals was 
moderately large and significant, r (68) = 0.46, p<0.001, CI 95%[.25,.63], suggesting 
that 21.1% of the variance in typicality was predictable by the variance in ideals. The 
correlation between typicality and familiarity was even stronger: r (68) = 0.60, 
p<0.001, CI 95%[.43,.74], with 36.5% of typicality variance being predicted by the 
variance in familiarity. Figure 3 shows two scatterplots of these two relationships. 
However, the correlation between mean scores on ideals and mean scores on familiarity 
was much weaker with r (68) = 0.18, p = 0.132, CI 95%[-.06,+.40], thus explaining 
Highest-rated Locations Mean (sd) 
Typicality Score 
Lowest-rated Locations Mean (sd) 
Typicality 
Score 
Shirley - overall mean 6.46 (1.31) 
Shirley High Street 8.21 (1.28) Betting Shops 5.88 (2.44) 
Charity Shops 7.37 (1.86) Detached Houses 5.40 (2.54) 
Shopping Precinct 7.26 (1.88) Schools 5.02 (2.33) 
Bedford Place – overall mean 6.61 (1.33) 
Large Town Houses 7.62 (1.78) Offices 6.05 (2.47) 
Main Street 7.40 (1.86) Co-op (supermarket) 5.24 (2.30) 
Georgian Buildings 7.33 (1.87) Sainsbury's (supermarket) 5.12 (2.55) 
Highfield – overall mean 6.15 (1.58) 
University 7.52 (1.67) Semi-Detached Houses 5.10 (2.43) 
Expensive Houses 7.07 (2.36) Flats 5.00 (2.36) 
Highfield Church 6.79 (2.32) Shops 4.62 (2.12) 
Ocean Village – overall mean 6.93 (1.21) 
Marina 8.47 (1.03) Offices 6.51 (1.99) 
Calshot Spit Light Vessel 7.86 (1.46) Car Park 5.09 (2.85) 
Harbour Lights Cinema 7.77 (1.59) Shops 4.98 (2.74) 
St Mary’s – overall mean 5.97 (1.31) 
Stadium 7.12 (2.43) Flats 5.35 (2.39) 
St Mary’s High Street 7.02 (2.17) Jury's Inn (hotel) 4.93 (2.70) 
St Mary’s Church 6.65 (2.32) Charlotte Place Roundabout 4.93 (2.67) 
  
Table 1. Mean typicality scores for each locality's top three locations; and across all locations. 





Figure 3. Scatterplots to demonstrate the relationship between typicality and the two variables: 
ideals and familiarity 
Partial correlations were computed to assess the unique predictive power of both ideals 
and familiarity on typicality. The resulting findings were that neither of the correlations 
or variance estimates changed by a large amount. When familiarity was partialled out, 
the correlation between typicality and ideals was still r (65) = 0.445, p < 0.001, CI 
95%[.23,.62]. The unique variance in typicality that could be explained by ideals on its 
own was thus estimated at 19.8%. Partialling out ideals made almost no difference at 
all to the correlation between typicality and familiarity: r (65) = 0.60, p < 0.001, CI 
95%[.41,.73], accounting for 35.4% of the unique variance in typicality. It therefore 
seems that the effects of familiarity and ideals on the goodness-of-example ratings were 
strongly independent. 
An OLS regression analysis suggested that together, familiarity and ideals explained 
Figure 2. Mean typicality at various Highfield 
locations. Neither central tendency nor vague 
boundaries are evident here; however, no 
images were included from more locally 
disputed areas to the east and south of this 
map. Highfield's 'ideal' is high-end housing 
around the university campus; low-rated 
scenes showed more commonplace buildings 
such as a cornershop. 
47% of the variance in typicality: adjusted R2 = .47, F(2,67) = 31.2, p < .001. Checks 
showed that the data met all assumptions of multiple linear regression concerning 
outliers, residual normality and collinearity. 
2.4 Discussion 
The idea that locations may make a greater or lesser contribution to the 'sense' or 'ideal' 
of a place, which was intuitively reasonable but previously untested, clearly made sense 
to participants in this study. Unsurprisingly, goodness of example was also strongly 
dependent on participants' own familiarity with the individual locations - a reminder 
that places are bound to have individual meanings depending on people's experiences 
within them. 
The results show that for different neighborhoods, all of which contained some 
housing, shops and other facilities as one might expect in a city, different types of 
feature were considered 'good' examples despite being in each case a unique item 
within the neighborhood. This thus seems to hint at a strong role for goals or ideals in 
people's thinking about each place, rather than general principles such as spatial 
centrality or genuine representativeness. Table 1 also shows that variability of ratings 
(standard deviations) was consistently higher for the lower-ranked locations than at the 
top. This would be consistent with the notion that certain locations are iconic and 
viewed by many as the neighborhood's 'ideal', whereas other locations are more or less 
well recognised by different individuals – as opposed to a consensus based on central 
tendency (distance from a core). 
An anonymous reviewer of this paper raised the concept of salience as an explanation 
for the focus on visually atypical scenes. In the context of cognition of scenes in one's 
local environment, it is usually argued that salience itself splits into visual salience, 
structural salience (useful for navigation) and semantic salience (relevance to goals) - 
see Raubal and Winter (2002) and many subsequent studies based on the same 
distinctions. The second and third of these dimensions are arguably closely linked to 
the notion of goal-focused graded membership, and thus support the idea that people 
are not always judging purely by spatial constraints. In the context of rating typicality 
of exemplars, visual salience is linked closely to familiarity when participants have 
high local knowledge as they did here (see e.g. Johnson, 2001), because inevitably the 
most visually distinctive items will also subjectively feel the most familiar. Thus the 
various potential roles of salience may suggest that the scenes were being judged as 
category members, rather than merely for their spatial contiguity. 
From the perspective of treating places as categories of locations, clearly this result is 
encouraging. However, there are limitations to these findings. Firstly, the 'ideals' were 
imposed on participants as descriptions emerging from other people's views, although 
in all cases the participants were relatively long-term residents of the city, and would 
thus have had similar local understanding. Secondly, the study is correlational and, 
given that participants were being asked about the same locations three times in short 
succession, some degree of similarity of answers might be expected. 
Nevertheless, participants' ratings could have varied far less between locations, 
interpreting the questions simply as "is this in the place or not?" and giving neutral or 
high responses to all but the most peripheral items. As shown by the results above, 
however, this was apparently not their understanding of the task. 
In his 1985 paper, Barsalou also tried to show that his 'ideals' influence on typicality 
was not a case of simple central tendency. He did this by correlating items' typicality 
scores with the difference between each item's ideals score and its category's ideals 
score - i.e., its distance from the most common degree of 'idealness'. The correlation 
was very low, suggesting that the items which were most similar to others on ideals 
(the 'average' ones) were not the most typical. However, in the above data (and possibly 
in Barsalou's) we already know this to be likely, because obviously the correlation 
above suggests strongly that the highest scores on the ideal were the most typical. Also, 
if it had been the middling ideals scorers that were most typical, then the graph in 
Figure 1 would have had a parabolic shape, not a linear one. Barsalou's test was 
arguably not a good logical test of the extent to which central tendency might be 
relevant, since it might work independently of the role of ideals. 
3. Study 2: Roles of Ambiguity, Expertise, Context and Ideals 
From the evidence suggested by Study 1 above, and the previous geographical 
literature on urban neighborhoods and localities (e.g., Aitken, Stutz, Prosser, & 
Chandler, 1993; Coombes, 2000; Schnell, Benjamini, & Pash, 2005), it seems that 
many residents in many situations will apply at least partly goal-derived or heuristic 
models of place, rather than taxonomic ones like administrative defintions. 
Furthermore, locations considered to be 'good examples' may sometimes tend towards a 
characterization (e.g., fulfilling a specific function) rather than a spatial or semantic 
centre. Having established tentative evidence that places may thus work like semantic 
categories of locations, the next question is what aspects or criteria of similarity might 
be involved, particularly when judging the membership (or not) of borderline cases. 
If individual locations can be judged as more or less good examples of a larger place, a 
further question is what happens at the edges where vagueness is already known to 
occur. Could peripheral locations sometimes be 'in' but in other contexts 'not in' the 
place at all, as apparently happens with categories (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978; 
Verheyen, Hampton, & Storms, 2010)? This experiment was designed to test this 
aspect of categorisation, again as applied to locations within larger neighbourhoods. 
Hampton (2007) hazarded three potential ways in which categorization of an instance 
(e.g. an object) might vary with context within the same individual: changes occurring 
in either (a) the representation of the instance; (b) the representation of the category; or 
(c) the threshold of similarity required to categorize the instance into it. Hence the same 
person could classify the same entity differently due to circumstance – sometimes into 
one category, and sometimes into another – creating the effect of vagueness. Hampton 
also argued that if people consider vagueness acceptable, perhaps reflecting social 
constraints, then the same person may be aware that they could classify a given 
instance as both "X and not X" – a result which he claimed was difficult to represent in 
the fuzzy logic often used to model vaguely bounded entities. 
Clearly, any such uncertainty or instability in the overlap between places is a crucial 
outcome for any attempts to map what is often termed vernacular geography - the 
places known to and named by local people, but not recognised within administrative 
digital data. A non-overlapping and non-context-sensitive data model is unlikely to 
reflect local people's reality if individuals' place classifications even vary within 
themselves. We need to be know whether to build an understanding of contextual 
factors into predicting a location's place classification. 
Meanwhile, semantic memory research since the 1980s has also suggested that, if 
anything, we may use ideals for more types of categories than Barsalou predicted – 
sometimes even for natural-kind categories that are obviously taxonomic such as trees 
or birds (Burnett, Medin, Ross, & Blok, 2005; Lynch et al., 2000). Furthermore, certain 
types of expert in those studies seemed to rely on ideals (fitness for purpose rather than 
similarity) much more than the novice student participants used in many laboratory 
studies. Yet different types of expert (e.g., professional landscapers versus taxonomists) 
will apply different ideals, and at the highest expertise levels personal familiarity may 
have a greater impact than any central tendency (Johnson, 2001). 
However, professional expertise is typically applied only within a professional context. 
Experts may be able to think more as non-experts do within everyday contexts. Thus 
we might expect to see within- as well as between-subjects differences in the effects of 
expertise on place judgments, when contexts change. 
Therefore, this second study tested the location-within-place decisions of the same 
group of formally trained geographic experts under different circumstances, to see 
whether changes of context and role could indeed affect 'in' versus 'not in' place 
decisions for even these professionally constrained individuals. If participants showed 
substantial variations in their decisions under different circumstances, then this would 
suggest that places' spatial vagueness relates both to inter-individual differences, and to 
variations in judgment within each person. If a person is professionally trained, they 
might be expected to make more consistent decisions than others might, so using 
surveyors was a 'hard' test of this hypothesis. 
This time, to avoid the potential artifacts or demand characteristics created by imposing 
pre-specified places, locations and descriptions upon participants, expert participants 
were asked to imagine places they knew well themselves. They were to place 
themselves in varying imaginary role and task contexts, while considering the criteria 
they might use to judge a location's neighborhood membership. 
Our first experimental hypothesis was that a more formal expertise-demanding scenario 
- having to define the boundaries of a suburb so that it could be labelled appropriately 
within official national mapping data - would alter the relative weighting of the criteria 
used for individual location-categorizing judgments: the experts might then be swayed 
by more formal factors than when judging a location for informal or personal reasons. 
This within-participants finding might thus echo previous between-participants findings 
(Bailenson, Shum, Atran, Medin, & Coley, 2002) concerning expertise effects in 
categorization of birds. Thus we expected an interaction between the effect of varying 
scenarios and decision motivations on the relevance of different criteria to place 
decisions. 
However, our second hypothesis was that, across the scenarios, certain potential criteria 
for naming a location would always be preferred over others. If assigning locations to a 
place is like semantic categorization, then the latter literature predicts that some 
category features will be prioritised over others even though all might sometimes be 
relevant. Thus we would expect a significant main effect of differences among criteria 
in their relevance to surveyors' judgments, regardless of the scenario (judging 
placement professionally versus for personal usage), and regardless of whether the 
decision aimed to include or to exclude locations from a place. If we were instead to 
see little consistency in criterion preferences across scenarios and decision types, then 
it would be difficult to apply standard categorization models to geographic knowledge. 
Instead, it would imply that different contexts (tasks and populations) would invoke 
very different choices about the same places. This would fit with previous findings 
concerning categorization of natural kinds (Medin & Atran, 2004; Medin, Lynch, 
Coley, & Atran, 1997), but would make it hard to model any consistent sense of local 
places. 
Third, if Hampton was correct, then people could categorise the same item (location) 
both as 'in' and 'not in' a category (locality) depending on circumstance and based on 
flexible weightings of relevant factors. Thus we might see different criteria prioritised 
when one was motivated to include a given location in a place, than when one was 
considering reasons to exclude it - i.e., an interaction of decision type with criterion - 
which could even be a three-way interaction if these choices also depended on the task 
scenario. If not, then simultaneous 'in and not in' judgements may be less feasible; 
people may after all be fairly consistent in locational categorization decisions. 
3.1 Participants 
22 professional field surveyors working for Ordnance Survey, the national mapping 
agency of Great Britain, took part in the experiment. These surveyors (19 male, 1 
female and 2 undisclosed; median age group 45-54 years) worked mostly from home 
and were spread geographically across the country. 
Although formally authorising and recording place names and extents is no longer a 
part of this role (and the importance of the role itself is shrinking over time relative to 
other forms of data collection), all but one of the surveyors were experienced enough 
(mean experience=28.5 years, s.d.=9, range 8-38 years) to remember having had to do 
it formally in the past, and/or to have more recently done it informally as part of 
general updates of mapping data. Most of them also used the questionnaire to express 
their views and ideas on the organisation's ongoing issues with, and potential means of 
collecting, place information. This was therefore a highly motivated, as well as deeply 
expert, participant sample. 
3.2 Materials and Procedure 
A paper questionnaire was distributed via organisational channels, which participants 
completed in their own time and mailed back to the researcher. Following initial 
briefing and instructions, the questionnaire booklet had three independent sections, 
whose order was counterbalanced between participants - making six versionst. Each 
section had a page of context-setting (mostly open-ended) questions, then two sets of 
Likert rating-scale items. Participants were instructed not to look back to previous 
sections while completing later ones. 
The 'Work' section's first page focused on the surveyor's work context, asking questions 
about their role, length of experience, current and previous geographical regions, and 
experience and views concerning collecting place names and extents. The participant 
was then asked to name a town where they had done some surveying, but which they 
did not know very well, and asked whether they had ever had to collect placename 
information there. 
On turning over the page, they were asked to imagine that they were trying to decide if 
a certain location in the town fell within a particular named neighborhood. 13 potential 
criteria were then listed, beside Likert rating scales2 from 0-5 where 0 was labelled 
"Not at all" and 5 was labelled "A lot". Participants had to circle a number for how 
much each criterion would help them decide that the location fell within the 
neighborhood. (Participants could also write in and rate their own criteria although few 
did so3.) The next page asked them which of the criteria (now in a different randomised 
order) would help them to decide that another location was not in the neighborhood. 
The 'Home' section was similar, except the initial questions referred to the surveyor's 
own home area, asking them to name their town, state their length of residence there, 
and name a neighborhood within it that they knew very well either from living or 
visiting it. They were asked to think of and name two locations or features near the 
                                                   
2 Piloting had suggested that a longer scale would not be meaningful, and would be too fatiguing 
for this many questions. 
3 9 of the participants added (at the most) one or two extra criteria for one of the scenarios – too 
few to analyse. They included (no. of participants): local government officials' views (2); local 
residents' views (2); neighborhood names appearing on streetname signs, as in some post-war 
UK 'new' towns (2); the location being visibly dominant or spatially central within the 
neighborhood (3); thematic groups of related street names (1); being on a different bus route 
from the rest of the neighborhood (1). 
edge of that neighborhood, not necessarily near each other. For each location the 
participants indicated their confidence (0-10) that the location was within the 
neighborhood, and the percentage of local people whom they thought would agree that 
it was. Then, similarly to the 'Work' section, the next two pages asked participants to 
rate different criteria for their usefulness if one wanted to argue to include one location 
within the neighborhood, and again if arguing to exclude the other location.  
The 'New Area' section asked the participant to imagine moving home to a new area, 
and to consider the problem of evaluating what estate agents told them about a given 
house being within a desirable neighborhood. Participants were initially asked how 
recently they had moved home; in the 'in' and 'out' criteria-rating pages they were asked 
to imagine firstly trying to find evidence that a house did fall within a desired 
neighborhood, and secondly that an estate agent was 'stretching the truth' about another 
house that was not within it. Once again, the same 13 randomly-ordered criteria were 
presented for rating in each case. After the above three sections were presented in a 
randomised order, a final page debriefed participants as to the study's purpose, and 
invited additional comments. 
The questionnaire thus represented three independent within-participant variables: 
'Scenario' (work, home or new area); 'Decision' (in versus out of a given 
neighborhood); and 'Criteria' (the 13 potential factors that could be used to decide how 
to place the located house or other feature). The dependent variable throughout was the 
rating given by participants on the Likert scales. 
3.2.1 Criteria 
The 13 criteria for judging neighborhood membership were described in full sentences 
within the questionnaires, but are presented in slightly shortened form here for ease of 
reference: 
A. Right/wrong side of a physical barrier e.g. road or embankment 
B. Same/different administrative, electoral or school district 
C. Neighborhood name does (not) appear in Royal Mail official address 
D. Named this way (or not) by real estate agents or property developers 
E. Always/never referred to this way by local people 
F. Mentioned (or not) using this name in the local media, tourist or other local 
information 
G. Name (dis)similar to that of the neighborhood 
H. Close to/far from a key feature e.g. shops, church, park, main street 
I. Close to/far from the placement of the name on maps 
J. (Dis)similar visual appearance to the rest of the neighborhood 
K. People in this neighborhood like (or don't like) to be associated with it 
L. Same/different function/use as the rest of the neighborhood 
M. Age or other sense of belonging to/differing from it 
 
These criteria partly reflect the known literature on place cohesion (S. C. Aitken & 
Prosser, 1990; Beguin & Romero, 1996; T. Lee, 1968; Martin, 2003; Schnell et al., 
2005; Talen & Shah, 2007), and partly known (and partly British-specific) issues which 
had been identified in previous research (Davies et al., 2009). These included the Royal 
Mail's use of some locality names in their official address designations, and people's 
frequently stated reliance on Ordnance Survey (OS) maps for reference as an assumed 
'correct' source. 
It will be noted that criteria A-C imply crisp and definitive 'in/out' factors, and thus 
preclude any sense of graded membership. As suggested earlier, we might expect 
formal geography experts to prefer these criteria, particularly when working within 
their professional context. Criteria D-G are dependent on potentially variable use of the 
neighborhood name by other people, generally in non-definitive contexts, and thus 
evoke Barsalou's (1985) idea of 'frequency of instantiation': the more often the location 
is nominally included within the neighborhood by other sources, the more this 
inclusion may be assumed. Items H and I concern central tendency: potential distance 
from an imagined spatial core or prototype. Items J-M involve non-spatial factors that 
evoke some kind of 'ideal'. For example, as seen in Study 1, a beautiful historic house, 
church or monument may be seen as the epitomy of an older neighborhood, without 
actually being at all typical of it. 
3.3 Results 
A three-way (3 Scenario x 2 Decision x 13 Criterion conditions) repeated-measures 
ANOVA4 was conducted using SPSS, applying Huynh-Feldt correction for non-
sphericity (Abdi, 2010; Haverkamp & Beauducel, 2017).  
 










A. Physical barrier 3.56 (0.15) 3.25 3.87 
G. Name match 3.24 (0.13) 2.96 3.51 
B. Administrative district 3.20 (0.24) 2.70 3.69 
F. Media, tourist or other information sources 3.10 (0.19) 2.70 3.50 
I. Map name placement 3.10 (0.21) 2.66 3.54 
H. Close to key feature 3.04 (0.16) 2.70 3.39 
C. Royal Mail address 3.06 (0.19) 2.66 3.45 
E. Local people's usage 2.98 (0.19) 2.59 3.38 
D. Property (real estate) agents/developers 2.81 (0.18) 2.43 3.19 
K. Local desirability 2.62 (0.18) 2.25 2.99 
M. Age/belongingness 2.58 (0.20) 2.16 3.01 
J. Visual appearance 2.31 (0.20) 1.89 2.74 
L. Function/use 2.30 (0.19) 1.90 2.70 
Table 2. Marginal mean estimates for the thirteen criteria, across scenarios and decisions. 
 
The largest effect in the analysis was the main effect of Criterion, which was 
significant as hypothesised: F(5.2,108.9) = 5.92, p < .001, pη2 = 0.22. This implies that 
the 13 criteria apparently did vary in their perceived relevance, irrespective of the 
scenario and whether the decision was motivated to include or exclude the location - 
see Table 2. The largest marginal mean difference in ratings between any two criteria 
was between the relatively highly-rated criterion A (physical barrier) and the relatively 
                                                   
4 Careful consideration was given to the analysis approach. Although occasionally authors argue 
that Likert-scaled data is best suited to non-parametric analysis (Liddell & Kruschke, 2018), 
others show that where the scale implies continuous incremental measurement rather than 
separately named ordinal categories, and at least 5 scale points, parametric approaches can still 
be suitable (De Winter & Dodou, 2010; Harpe, 2015). Mixed linear modelling was also 
considered, but this is considered unreliable for small samples with relatively large numbers of 
repeats (Haverkamp & Beauducel, 2017). 
low-rated criterion L (function/use), with a mean difference of 1.26, s.e. = 0.22, p = 
.001, CI 95% [0.36, 2.16]. 
The other two main effects, of Scenario and Decision, were small and non-significant 
overall. For Scenario, F(2, 42) = 1.14, p = .33, pη2 = 0.05. For Decision, F(1, 21) = 
1.54, p = .23, pη2 = 0.07. Similarly, the two-way interaction between Scenario and 
Decision, disregarding Criterion, was also non-significant: F(1.73,36.32) = 3.06, p = 
.07, pη2 = 0.13. 
However, there were significant two-way interactions between Criterion and Scenario 
(F(16.52,346.94) = 4.23, p < .001, pη2 = 0.17, see also Figure 3) and between Criterion 
and Decision (F(12,252) = 3.26, p < .001, pη2 = 0.13). The three-way interaction was 
also significant as hypothesised: F(13.85,290.96) = 2.83, p = .001, pη2 = 0.12. 
 
 
Figure 3. Variations in mean criteria ratings for the three scenarios, disregarding decision focus. 
(Error bars represent 1 standard error.) 
As an illustration of the complex three-way variations in the data, Figure 4 shows 
separate Scenario x Decision (raw) mean graphs for the three criteria whose mean 
rating varied the most between conditions. These were criteria C (Royal Mail postal 
address), E (locals' tendency to include the location) and K (matching perceived 
desirability). The three graphs vary considerably in profile, while the error bars (again 
showing 1 standard error) remind us that there were also quite wide individual 
differences among the surveyors5.  
 
 
Figure 4. Graphs showing the variations by Scenario and Decision of the three criteria with the 
widest range of mean scores. (Error bars again represent 1 s.e.) 
3.4 Discussion 
Clearly, despite the surveyors' homogeneous roles and formal professional training, 
they displayed a clear recognition that a building or location can be included into a 
larger neighborhood based on of varying criteria, and similarly excluded when so 
motivated. Table 2 and Figure 3 show that in general, across scenarios, this participant 
sample tended to prioritize crisp boundary information (criteria A to C) and centrality 
(criteria H and I) in deciding about a given location. This makes particular sense within 
their 'work' context, given a professional concern with creating clear cartographic 
information. 
Figure 3 shows quite clearly that the criteria which might be thought of as representing 
a neighborhood's 'ideal' (J to M) were among the lowest rated across decisions and 
scenarios, thus differentiating this participant sample from the non-expert local 
residents of Study 1. For this context, then, expert categorisation does not seem to lean 
on ideals so much as on more formal and authoritative definitions. This is unlike the 
experts studied by Lynch et al. (2000) but more similar to tree taxonomists and US (but 
not native-culture) bird experts (Bailenson et al., 2002; Medin et al., 1997). 
At the same time, the relatively high ratings of criteria F and G showed that 
information from external sources, such as a common name or a media reference, could 
also influence the categorization. This fits our general understanding of categorization 
in other domains: e.g., people accept that tomatoes are defined as a fruit based on 
expert instruction, despite using them mostly in savoury meals. 
                                                   
5 There were just six (apparently random and accidental) missing ratings out of 1716 item 
responses. Given the unavoidably small size of our expert sample, and the way that SPSS drops 
participants 'listwise' in repeated-measures ANOVA, we imputed the missing values with the 
series mean to avoid losing data. Meanwhile, participant 7 circled all zeroes for the 'new home - 
out' condition, commenting that he would care more about the house than its non-membership 
of a neighborhood. The ANOVA was rerun three times, to exclude the imputed missing values 
or participant 7 or both. In every case the pattern of findings was exactly as above, except that 
excluding participant 7 made the two-way Scenario x Decision interaction reach significance: 
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The chief overall finding is that the relative importance of different criteria did vary 
greatly across contexts, even though the participants were having to merely imagine 
those contexts rather than actively perform a categorization. From Figures 3 and 4 it is 
clear that the professional task of identifying the neighborhood to which a landmark or 
location belonged involved weighting various criteria quite differently than the two 
more personal scenarios. For 'work' but not for 'home' contexts the surveyors prioritised 
physical and formal sources of information above more subjective criteria, such as an 
area's visible character and perceived desirability. Similarly, trying to establish a 
location as within a neighborhood seems to have been viewed differently from the 
decision to exclude it, although again this varied with criterion type and the imagined 
scenario. 
In Victorian times locality names and boundaries were obtained through surveyors 
asking only relatively well-educated locals to define them - which created most of the 
present cartographic labels on British maps (Harley, 1971), However, the present 
results suggest that this approach may have resulted in cartographic name labels that 
never represented ordinary locals' knowledge of their neighborhoods, but only those of 
the far rarer educated professionals. Even with digital online data collections, this 
representativeness problem - who has contributed to the data and who has not - still has 
important implications for modern-day data capture and modelling of places (Caquard, 
2014; Purves, Edwardes, & Wood, 2011). Of course, it is also important to replicate 
key findings like those above, before using them to guide the choice of theoretical and 
computational models of place categorization. 
4. General Discussion 
These two studies' findings imply that urban neighborhoods - and perhaps by extension 
other places such as cities themselves or distinctive rural areas - may indeed be treated 
cognitively as semantic categories of locations, complementing (and sometimes 
contradicting) their spatial definitions, and helping to explain why the latter tend to be 
vaguely bounded. The two studies between them illustrate several of the same features 
of categorization as earlier studies of natural and non-natural kinds of object. 
Obviously, much more needs to be done to figure out the (potentially varying) 
structures of place categories under different circumstances, but there is exciting 
potential to apply insights from the human semantic memory literature to place 
understanding. 
Two important limitations of this set of studies concern (1) our inability to abstract 
general principles from these findings to the conceptualisation of all places (rural, 
wilderness or urban places of different size and type such as whole cities); and (2) the 
fact that the above has demonstrated only certain aspects of categorization and category 
structure. Regarding (1), geographical information (GI) research has partly validated 
the current approach by showing that in both online and offline text sources, the names 
of vaguely-bounded places tend to co-occur with the names of specific landmarks or 
locations within those places' bounds, for both urban and rural or wilderness places 
(Edwardes & Purves, 2007; C. B. Jones et al., 2008;  Purves, Clough, Joho, & Jones, 
2005). 'Grounding' named places as collections of member locations with distinct 
semantic characteristics can thus offer a (literally!) conceptual model for the work on 
place in environmental psychology and in human(ist) geography (Devine-Wright & 
Clayton, 2010; Purves & Derungs, 2015). 
Regarding our second limitation (2), although these findings omit some key aspects of 
categories such as hierarchical structure and the presence of a 'basic level' in place 
categories (Murphy & Lassaline, 1997), various work in geography and GI has long 
suggested the presence of both phenomena (Edwardes & Purves, 2007; Hirtle & 
Jonides, 1985; Lloyd et al., 1996). Certainly, from the above evidence we can 
tentatively conclude that places are locational categories which are fuzzy, influenced by 
context and expertise, and at least sometimes driven by functional 'ideal' concerns as 
much as by central tendency or physical/spatial similarity.  
Therefore, these initial results suggest that we name and categorize areas of large-scale 
space into places, in the same way as we group objects and other phenomena. 
Presumably this occurs for exactly the same obvious reason: it greatly simplifies our 
reasoning and language. In large-scale space, precise metric measurement is impossible 
without technology. Before that existed (and whenever it is absent, as in everyday life 
until very recently), humans have had to cope with approximations of distance and 
direction, and to organize and communicate about space partly through grouping and 
naming key locations. This required fuzziness and flexibility in spatial reasoning and 
language, supplementing our internal spatial coordinate systems - such as place and 
grid cells - with our far vaguer notions of place. 
Arguably, as with physical objects, our categorisation of space is also largely socially 
learned via exemplars rather than sharply defined: somebody tells us that a certain 
building is "in Ashwood" and "not in Birchfield", just as we learn (as children) that Mrs 
Brown's poodle is a dog but our brother's hamster isn't. Inevitably, this learning via 
exemplars often fails to define a sharp, unambiguous line between two categories or 
places, despite encountering occasional disagreements and more formal distinctions. 
Places such as neighborhoods are thus semantically vague in people's minds just like 
many other concepts. People can name fairly consistent characteristics of a place (e.g., 
features and functions, types of people and experiences), as our pilot participants did 
prior to Study 1, yet this often would not sufficiently differentiate it from others even if 
those characteristics' spatial distributions were fully known (and of course, some are 
unknowable). 
Of course, places are often also spatially vague. This can occur because of the above 
semantic vagueness, making it hard to pin down what a placename means to each 
person - let alone across individuals. It may also occur because the distributions of even 
the characteristics which do differentiate neighbouring places (e.g., poverty, housing 
density, aesthetic considerations) often change gradually rather than sharply across the 
space. Thus a place may be subject to Sorites' Paradox in two ways at once – 
semantically and spatially (Fisher, 2000). Yet a place such as a neighbourhood might 
still appear spatially vague even if all its key characteristics were to change sharply, but 
did so at slightly different boundary streets or other points so that people's spatial 
delineation could change with perspective, knowledge, context or task - as we saw 
above that it can indeed do. 
Thus many familiar places are both semantically and spatially defined to some extent, 
yet are bound to remain vague in both respects. However we achieve it, the key 
application challenge is to use these cognitive insights to build more humanly realistic 
place understanding into predictive spatial models, finally relating them back to the 
humanistic literature on concepts and meanings of place. 
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